In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, disinformation has reached unprecedented proportions, posing a number of challenges to societies worldwide. Many nation-states have taken measures to combat disinformation; however, the strategies and policies adopted to address this issue differ in each region of the world. Encountering disinformation myself made me think about the lack of local news outlets and my use and reliance on social media platforms. Local news outlets serve as information sources for local communities about developments that directly impact them. At the same time, the rise of social media platforms worldwide has transformed the dynamics of information dissemination, offering speedy access to local and global news. But, while these platforms act as easily accessible sources of news, they have also become a breeding ground for disinformation. Marsden et. al. argue that fake news or disinformation “has recently become endemic to social networking on the Internet” (2). The rise of disinformation is highly interlinked with the fall of local news, especially during the global COVID-19 pandemic. “As local news sources have declined, a growing proportion of Americans are getting their news and other information from social media” (Ardia et. al., 21). Platforms such as Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook have become a main source of gathering information. In their book Platforms and Cultural Production, Poell et. al. argue that US platform-based disinformation campaigns coincide with a decline of trust in legacy news organizations (198).
With the rise of social media platforms, the fall of local news, and the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been a number of strategies and measures put in place aimed at combating the issue of disinformation. These strategies, however, differ in each region of the world. The Global Digital Cultures conference and workshop were aimed at rethinking the existing platform research practices. In our tutorial Global Perspectives on Platforms and Cultural Production, we read selected chapters from Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (2008), in which Dipesh Chakrabarty discusses that “provincializing Europe” is not “culture specific” (43). He argues that the narrative of “modernity” as we know it “points to a certain ‘Europe’ as the primary habitus of the modern” (43). As scholars, we cannot simply use the same lens of analysis when looking at vastly different regional case studies. As most scholarship on platforms focusses on North America and Europe, scholarship from other parts of the world is often dismissed. I would point out that even in the context of the European landscape, we can see a discrepancy in platform research between the West and East. This blog post will provide an overview of the different measures taken against disinformation in the non-EU Eastern European countries in comparison with the European Union and analyses the correlation between the fall of local news, the rise of platforms and the information disorders that come with these changes. Combating information disorders and the strategies employed to do so must be tailored based on the local political landscape. As scholars, focusing our research on regional disparities would provide a nuanced understanding of effective counter-disinformation strategies that accordingly resonate with the intricacies of each region.
Before we dive into an analysis of the different strategies used for combating this issue, we need to distinguish between the terms disinformation and misinformation. While these terms are often used interchangeably, Greene et. al. define disinformation as a “conscious attempt to encourage people to believe something that the producers and/or disseminators of the content know to be untrue” (11). Therefore, disinformation is intentional. Misinformation on the other hand is a continuation of disinformation as it refers to the unintentional spread of false information (Turčilo and Obrenović, 9). These concepts of misinformation, disinformation, as well as malinformation can be referred to as “information disorders” (Turčilo and Obrenović, 11). These definitions and frameworks will become particularly important when discussing the contemporary information landscape, which we can refer to as the post-truth era.
The characteristics of the post-truth era would be “the distortion of the truth and the manipulation of the consent of ordinary people by political and economic elites, and the discrediting of the media and political opponents by accusing them of spreading disinformation and misleading the public” (Turčilo and Obrenović, 16). In the post-truth era, what is seen as truth is completely malleable. Personal beliefs are playing a big role in shaping public opinion. There are a number of actors that are producing and spreading disinformation, such as trolls, fake-news websites, conspiracy theorists, media outlets, politicians, foreign governments and more (Tucker et.al., 22). One might see fake news as purely an issue emerging from the fall of local news, the rise of platforms, or platform governance. However, the problem of fake news is also reflective of the public nation-state (dis)order. “Neither fake news nor post-truth is strictly about journalism; instead, it is indicative of fluid conditions in public communication across the globe that have destabilized modern assumptions about news and truth” (Waisbord, 3). Fake news, as Waisbord argues, is “symptomatic of the collapse of the old news order and the chaos of contemporary public communication” (3). The changing dynamics in the current state of public communication leaves me questioning who the producers of disinformation are.
While foreign actors play a big role in the area of disinformation in the EU, Greene argues that “most of the producers and disseminators of disinformation–in the Western Balkans and around the world–are domestic and pursue local aims” (12). For example, Greene argues that the need for local politicians to preserve their reputation and justify the lack of measures imposed against the virus are some of the factors that motivated disinformation in the Western Balkans (41). “Most of these efforts sought to play down the level of threat posed by the virus in order to justify a lack of action on the part of the government” (Greene, 41). But what causes this process of information disorders and why is it more prominent in some areas over others? Greene argues that countries which are faced with internal conflicts, such as religious, regional, or ethnic conflicts are prone to disinformation (12). Like Waisbord, Greene sees fake news as symptoms of societal disorders and chaos. “Information disorder–including disinformation–is most often the symptom of social and political disorder, rather than the cause” (Greene, 12). This shows us that research on information disorders should not just be aimed at the role that digital platforms have in facilitating the spread of fake news or the measures they take, but also focus on the political context in which information disorders live.
The creation and spread of fake news can be regulated by the platform itself through creating new policies, moderating content, or reporting users. However, with the rise of platforms, nation-states and intergovernmental organizations have taken it upon themselves to tackle information disorders. For example, the EU launched a Code of Practice on Disinformation in October 2018 (Pamment, 8). Following this, in December 2018, the European Commission launched the Action Plan Against Disinformation (Pamment, 8). This plan would aid the EU in fighting disinformation by improving the process of detecting, analyzing and exposing disinformation in various EU institutions (Pamment, 8). Documents such as these are already a big step in combating the issue of disinformation on a European level. Marsden et.al. argue that “the most important European policy document dealing with disinformation was the result of policy formation in 2018” (3). While the European Union is implementing new strategies and tactics to counter disinformation, there are distinct challenges for non-EU Eastern European countries in their efforts to safeguard against the proliferation of disinformation.
Sunter argues that “disinformation is an endemic phenomenon in the Western Balkans caused by internal factors”. On the other hand, Greene argues that “an unusual proportion of the disinformation campaigns at work in North Macedonia focus on international issues” (28). For example, rather than having a purely domestic agenda, information disorders in North Macedonia are focused on international matters. “Disinformation campaigns in North Macedonia that involve foreign relations focus overwhelmingly on issues of identity–whether the name change, or inter-ethnic relations–rather than on issues of integration or geopolitical allegiance” (Greene, 29). In North Macedonia, social media plays a vital role in the creation and spread of disinformation. However, traditional news outlets are still a prominent source of acquiring information. “Disinformation campaigns in North Macedonia tend to have important social media components–most prominently on Facebook, as well as YouTube and Twitter–but rely critically on traditional media…” (Greene, 30). From the countries in the region of the Western Balkans, Serbia is the most affected by foreign disinformation (Sunter). “The bulk of Serbian disinformation aims to shift opinions vis-à-vis elections, public figures or internal Serbian politics more broadly” (Greene, 31). Disinformation tactics therefore, are aimed towards shaping public opinions about domestic political issues. Tucker et. al. argue that politicians “create disinformation and/ or amplify disinformation from other sources” (5). Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the context in which politicians amplify disinformation. Greene argues that besides Russia’s Sputnik Serbia, “international actors play a relatively minor role in the Serbian disinformation landscape” (31). The spread of disinformation is focused on a few different topics. “Roughly a third of campaigns reviewed focus on NATO or the EU, a third on the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars and post-war ‘reconciliation’, and the rest on electoral politics and COVID-19” (Greene, 32). COVID-19 related disinformation has been used “to shift general public opinion, to exacerbate internal conflict, and to affect the image–positively or negatively–of political leaders” (Greene, 40). Disinformation does not just arise on social media platforms, but is rather inherently influenced by the nation-state.
The ineffective strategies for tackling disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic have also affected the EU. “A lack of coherent policy—for example, in terms of supporting member states such as Italy that were exposed to the virus early on—contributed to an environment in which disinformation could spread more readily” (Pamment, 12). At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries in the EU were met with a lack of clear and cooperative policies required to deal with such an issue. In such periods of uncertainty there is an amplified need for more information. However, events such as a global pandemic create a perfect soil for the spread of disinformation. The issue of information disorders has been recognized on a global level with measures being taken by intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations. The project Sweet Victory is a behavioural science game, developed by the UN in order to build resilience against disinformation. The target audience for this game were UN officials and diplomats. However, the game can be accessed by anyone interested in behavioural science and international relations. Other ways to combat disinformation would be platform moderation, policy development, as well as fact checking. “There are two ways fact-checking is used: to monitor the veracity of political statements by leaders […], and to monitor the veracity of mass media content (mainly done by various NGOs)” (Turčilo and Obrenović, 29). In the Western Balkans, however, fact-checking “is reactive in nature and has a limited audience” (Sunter). In this region, there is a lack of consistency in monitoring online content and fack-checking does not reach a wider audience. Furthermore, many scholars also refer to the need for media literacy. “A media literate person understands the roles and functions of media in society and is able to critically evaluate media content and to interact with media, especially online media, in a mindful way” (Turčilo and Obrenović, 29). Media literacy is aimed at encouraging people to be critical of the contant they absorb, especially from social media platforms.
As we have seen through the Global Digital Cultures conference, duplicating frames of analysis from one region to another is often not the most productive way to understand an issue. “Applying solutions based on practices from other parts of Europe is not sufficient” (Sunter). In regions that lack the infrastructure needed to combat disinformation, such as the Western Balkans, the challenge of disinformation cannot be effectively addressed by platforms or states in isolation. Instead, there is a demand for increased cooperation. As we have seen, fact-checking and moderation tools have its limitations. Therefore, without the state’s initiative to invest in fact-checking resources or promote media literacy the efforts of platforms are not sufficient to deal with information disorders.
Author Bio
Stela Veta is a second year Research Master’s student in the department of Media Studies at the University of Amsterdam.
Works Cited
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Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “Chapter 1: Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History”. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton University Press, 2009. Pp. 27- 46. https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691130019/provincializing-europe
Greene, Samuel, et al. “Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them.” Policy Department for External Relations. February, 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2020)653621
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Tucker, Joshua A. et.al. “Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature”. March, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144139
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